Abstract. Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols enable two parties to establish a shared, cryptographically strong key over an insecure network using various authentication means, such as cryptographic keys, short (i.e., lowentropy) secret keys or credentials. In this paper, we provide a general framework, that encompasses several previous AKE primitives such as (Verifier-based) Password-Authenticated Key Exchange or Secret Handshakes, we call LAKE for Language-Authenticated Key Exchange. We first model this general primitive in the Universal Composability (UC) setting. Thereafter, we show that the Gennaro-Lindell approach can efficiently address this goal. But we need smooth projective hash functions on new languages, whose efficient implementations are of independent interest. We indeed provide such hash functions for languages defined by combinations of linear pairing product equations. Combined with an efficient commitment scheme, that is derived from the highly-efficient UC-secure Lindell's commitment, we obtain a very practical realization of Secret Handshakes, but also Credential-Authenticated Key Exchange protocols. All the protocols are UC-secure, in the standard model with a common reference string, under the classical Decisional Linear assumption.
Introduction
The main goal of an Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol is to enable two parties to establish a shared cryptographically strong key over an insecure network under the complete control of an adversary. AKE is one of the most widely used and fundamental cryptographic primitives. In order for AKE to be possible, the parties must have authentication means, e.g. (public or secret) cryptographic keys, short (i.e., low-entropy) secret keys or credentials that satisfy a (public or secret) policy. 2 from [CCGS10] but the two notions are very similar. In particular, the new primitive enables privacy-preserving authentication and key exchange protocols by allowing two members of the same group to secretly and privately authenticate to each other without revealing this group beforehand.
In order to define the security of this primitive, we use the UC framework and an appropriate definition for languages that permits to dissociate the public part of the policy, the private common information the users want to check and the (possibly independent) secret values each user owns that assess the membership to the languages. We provide an ideal functionality for LAKE and give efficient realizations of the new primitive (for a large family of languages) secure under classical mild assumptions, in the standard model (with a common reference string -CRS), with static corruptions.
We significantly improve the efficiency of several CAKE protocols [CCGS10] for specific languages and we enlarge the set of languages for which we can construct practical schemes. Notably, we obtain a very practical realization of Secret Handshakes and a Verifier-based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange.
Our Techniques. A general framework to design PAKE in the CRS model was proposed by Gennaro and Lindell [GL03] in 2003. This approach was applied to the UC framework by Canetti, Halevi, Katz, Lindell, and MacKenzie [CHK + 05], and improved by Abdalla, Chevalier and Pointcheval [ACP09] . It makes use of the smooth projective hash functions (SPHF), introduced by Cramer and Shoup [CS02] . Such a hashing family is a family of hash functions that can be evaluated in two ways: using the (secret) hashing key, one can compute the function on every point in its domain, whereas using the (public) projection key one can only compute the function on a special subset of its domain. Our first contribution is the description of smooth projective hash functions for new interesting languages: Abdalla, Chevalier and Pointcheval [ACP09] explained how to make disjunctions and conjunctions of languages, we study here languages defined by linear pairing product equations on committed values.
In 2011, Lindell [Lin11] proposed a highly-efficient commitment scheme, with a non-interactive opening algorithm, in the UC framework. We will not use it in black-box, but instead we will patch it to make the initial Gennaro and Lindell's approach to work, without zero-knowledge proofs [CHK + 05], using the equivocability of the commitment.
Language Definition. In [ACP09], Abdalla et al. already formalized languages to be considered for SPHF. But, in the following, we will use a more simple formalism, which is nevertheless more general: we consider any efficiently computable binary relation R : {0, 1} * × P × S → {0, 1}, where the additional parameters pub ∈ {0, 1} * and priv ∈ P define a language L R (pub, priv) ⊆ S of the words W such that R(pub, priv, W ) = 1:
-pub are public parameters; -priv are private parameters the two players have in mind, and they should think to the same values: they will be committed to, but never revealed; -W is the word the sender claims to know in the language: it will be committed to, but never revealed.
Our LAKE primitive, specific to two relations R a and R b , will allow two users, Alice and Bob, owning a word W a ∈ L Ra (pub, priv a ) and W b ∈ L R b (pub, priv b ) respectively, to agree on a session key under some specific conditions: they first both agree on the public parameter pub, Bob will think about priv a for his expected value of priv a , Alice will do the same with priv b for priv b ; eventually, if priv a = priv a and priv b = priv b , and if they both know words in the languages, then the key agreement will succeed. In case of failure, no information should leak about the reason of failure, except the inputs did not satisfy the relations R a or R b , or the languages were not consistent.
We stress that each LAKE protocol will be specific to a pair of relations (R a , R b ) describing the way Alice and Bob will authenticate to each other. This pair of relations (R a , R b ) specifies the sets P a , P b and S a , S b (to which the private parameters and the words should respectively belong). Therefore, the formats of priv a , priv b and W a and W b are known in advance, but not their values. When R a and R b are clearly defined from the context (e.g., PAKE), we omit them in the notations. For example, these relations can formalize:
-Password authentication: The language is defined by R(pub, priv, W ) = 1 ⇔ W = priv, and thus pub = ∅.
The classical setting of PAKE requires the players A and B to use the same password W , and thus we should have priv a = priv b = priv b = priv a = W a = W b ; 4 parameter k; Commit( , m; r) produces a commitment c on the input message m ∈ M using the random coins r $ ← R, under the label , and the opening information d; while Decommit ( , c, m, d) opens the commitment c with the message m and the opening information d that proves the correct opening under the label .
Such a commitment scheme should be both hiding, which says that the commit phase does not leak any information about m, and binding, which says that the decommit phase should not be able to open to two different messages. Additional features will be required in the following, such as non-malleability, extractability, and equivocability. We also included a label , which can be empty or an additional public information that has to be the same in both the commit and the decommit phases. A labeled commitment that is both non-malleable and extractable can be instantiated by an IND-CCA labeled encryption scheme (see the Appendix A.1). We will use the Linear Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [Sha07, CKP07] . We will then patch it, using a technique inspired from [Lin11] , to make it additionally equivocable (see Section 3). It will have an interactive commit phase, in two rounds: Commit( , m; r) and a challenge ε from the receiver, which will define an implicit full commitment to be open latter.
Smooth Projective Hash Functions
Smooth projective hash function (SPHF) systems have been defined by Cramer and Shoup [CS02] in order to build a chosen-ciphertext secure encryption scheme. They have thereafter been extended [GL03, ACP09, BPV12] and applied to several other primitives. Such a system is defined on a language L, with five algorithms:
-Setup(1 k ) generates the system parameters, according to a security parameter k; -HashKG(L) generates a hashing key hk for the language L; -ProjKG(hk, L, W ) derives the projection key hp, possibly depending on a word W ; -Hash(hk, L, W ) outputs the hash value from the hashing key; -ProjHash(hp, L, W, w) outputs the hash value from the projection key and the witness w that W ∈ L.
The correctness of the scheme assures that if W is in L with w as a witness, then the two ways to compute the hash values give the same result: Hash(hk, L, W ) = ProjHash(hp, L, W, w). In our setting, these hash values will belong to a group G. The security is defined through two different notions: the smoothness property guarantees that if W ∈ L, the hash value is statistically indistinguishable from a random element, even knowing hp; the pseudo-randomness property guarantees that even for a word W ∈ L, but without the knowledge of a witness w, the hash value is computationally indistinguishable from a random element, even knowing hp.
Double Linear Cramer-Shoup Encryption (DLCS)
As explained earlier, any IND-CCA labeled encryption scheme can be used as a non-malleable and extractable labeled commitment scheme: one could use the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme (see the Appendix A.4), but we will focus on the DLin-based primitives, and thus the Linear Cramer-Shoup scheme (see the Appendix A.3), we call LCS. Committed/encrypted elements will either directly be group elements, or bit-strings on which we apply a reversible mapping G from {0, 1} n to G. In order to add the equivocability, one can use a technique inspired from [Lin11] . See the Appendix B for more details, but we briefly present the commitment scheme we will use in the rest of this paper in conjunction with SPHF.
Linear Cramer-Shoup Commitment Scheme. The parameters, in the CRS, are a group G of prime order p, with three independent generators (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) $ ← G 3 , a collision-resistant hash function H K , and possibly an additional reversible mapping G from {0, 1} n to G to commit bit-strings. From 9 scalars (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) $ ← Z 9 p , one also sets, for i = 1, 2, c i = g . The public parameters consist of the encryption key ek = (G, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , c 1 , c 2 , d 1 , d 2 , h 1 , h 2 , H K ), while the trapdoor for extraction is dk = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ). One can define the encryption process: where ξ = H K ( , u, e). When ξ is specified from outside, one additionally denotes it LCS * ( , ek, M, ξ; r, s). The commitment to a message M ∈ G, or M = G(m) for m ∈ {0, 1} n , encrypts M under ek: LCSCom( , M ; r, s) LCS( , ek, M ; r, s). The decommit process consists of M and (r, s) to check the correctness of the encryption. It is possible to do implicit verification, without any decommit information, but just an SPHF on the language of the ciphertexts of M that is privately shared by the two players. Since the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CCA, this commitment scheme is non-malleable and extractable.
Double Linear Cramer-Shoup Commitment Schemes. To make it equivocable, we double the commitment process, in two steps. The CRS additionally contains a scalar ℵ $ ← Z p , one also sets, ζ = g ℵ 1 . The trapdoor for equivocability is ℵ. The Double Linear Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, denoted DLCS and detailed in the Appendix B is
where ξ = H K ( , u, e) is computed during the generation of C and transfered for the generation of C . As above, we denote DLCSCom denotes the use of DLCS with the encryption key ek. The usual commit/decommit processes are described on Figure 6 in the Appendix B. On Figure 1 , one can find the DLCSCom scheme where one can implicitly check the opening with an SPHF. These two constructions essentially differ with χ = H K (C ) (for the SPHF implicit check) instead of χ = H K (M, C ) (for the explicit check). We stress that with this alteration, the DLCSCom scheme is not a real commitment scheme (not formally extractable/binding): in DLCSCom , the sender can indeed encrypt M in C and N = 1 G in C , and then, the global ciphertext C · C ε contains M = M N ε = M , whereas one would have extracted M from C. But M is unknown before ε is sent, and thus, if one checks the membership of M to a sparse language, it will unlikely be true.
Multi-Message Schemes. One can extend these encryption and commitment schemes to vectors of n messages (see the Appendix B). We will denote them n-DLCSCom or n-DLCSCom for the commitment schemes. They consist in encrypting each message with independent random coins in
, together with independent companion ciphertexts C i of 1 G , still with the same ξ for the doubled version. In the latter case, n independent challenges ε i $ ← Z * p are then sent to lead to the full commitment (C i · C ε i i ) with random coins z r i = r i + ε i a i and z s i = s i + ε i b i . Again, if one of the companion ciphertext C i does not encrypt 1 G , the full commitment encrypts a vector with at least one unpredictable component M i . Several non-unity components in the companion ciphertexts would lead to independent components in the full commitment. For languages sparse enough, this definitely turns out not to be in the language.
SPHF for Implicit Proofs of Membership
In [ACP09], Abdalla et al. presented a way to compute a conjunction or a disjunction of languages by some simple operations on their projection keys. Therefore all languages presented afterward can easily be combined together. However as the original set of manageable languages was not really developed, we are going to present several steps to extend it, and namely in order to cover some languages useful in various AKE instantiations.
We will show that almost all the vast family of languages covered by the Groth-Sahai methodology [GS08] can be addressed by our approach too. More precisely, we can handle all the linear pairing product equations, when witnesses are committed using our above (multi-message) DLCSCom commitment scheme, or even the non-equivocable LCSCom version. This will be strong enough for our applications. For using them in black-box to build our LAKE protocol, one should note that the projection key is computed from the ciphertext C when using the simple LCSCom commitment, but also when using the DLCSCom version. The full commitment C ·C ε is not required, but ξ only, which is known as soon as C is given (or the vector (C i ) i for the multi-message version). Of course, the hash value will then depend on the full commitment (either C for the LCSCom commitment, or C · C ε for the DLCSCom commitment).
This will be relevant to our AKE problem: equality of two passwords, in PAKE protocols; corresponding signing/verification keys associated with a valid signature on a pseudonym or a hidden identity, in secret handshakes; valid credentials, in CAKE protocols. All those tests are quite similar: one has to show that the ciphertexts are valid and that the plaintexts satisfy the expected relations in a group. We first illustrate that with commitments of Waters signatures of a public message under a committed verification key. We then explain the general method. The formal proofs are provided in the Appendix C.
Commitments of Signatures
Let us consider the Waters signature [Wat05] in a symmetric bilinear group, as reviewed in the Appendix A.3, and then we just need to recall that, in a pairing-friendly setting (p, G, G T , e), with public parameters (F, g, h) , and a verification key vk, a signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is valid with respect to the message M under the key vk if it satisfies e(σ 1 , g) = e(h, vk) · e(F(M ), σ 2 ).
A similar approach has already been followed in [BPV12], however not with a Linear Cramer-Shoup commitment scheme, nor with such general languages. We indeed first consider the language of the signatures (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ G 2 of a message M ∈ {0, 1} k under the verification key vk ∈ G, where M is public but vk is private: L(pub, priv), where priv = vk and pub = M . One will thus commit the pair (vk, σ 1 ) ∈ G 2 with the label = (M, σ 2 ) using a 2-DLCSCom commitment and then prove the commitment actually contains (vk, σ 1 ) such that e(σ 1 , g) = e(h, vk) · e(F(M ), σ 2 ). We insist on the fact that σ 1 only has to be encrypted, and not σ 2 , in order to hide the signature, since the latter σ 2 is a random group element. If one wants unlinkability between signature commitments, one simply needs to re-randomize (σ 1 , σ 2 ) before encryption. Hence σ 2 can be sent in clear, but bounded to the commitment in the label, together with the pub part of the language. In order to prove the above property on the committed values, we will use conjunctions of SPHF: first, to show that each commitment is well-formed (valid ciphertexts), and then that the associated plaintexts verify the linear pairing equation, where the committed values are underlined: e(σ 1 , g) = e(h, vk) · e(F(M ), σ 2 ) Note that vk is not used as a committed value for this verification of the membership of σ to the language since this is the verification key expected by the verifier, specified in the private part priv, which has to be independently checked with respect to the committed verification key. This is enough for the affiliation-hiding property. We could consider the similar language where M ∈ {0, 1} k is in the word too: e(σ 1 , g) = e(h, vk) · e(F(M ), σ 2 ), and then one should commit M , bit-by-bit, and then use a (k + 2)-DLCSCom commitment.
Linear Pairing Product Equations
Instead of describing in details the SPHF for the above examples, let us show it for a more general framework: we considered
where the unknowns are underlined. These are particular instantiations of t simultaneous equations
where A k,i ∈ G, B k ∈ G T , and z k,i ∈ Z p , as well as A k ⊆ {1, . . . , m} and B k ⊆ {m + 1, . . . , n} are public, but the Y i ∈ G and Z i ∈ G T are simultaneously committed using the multi-message DLCSCom or LCSCom commitments scheme, in G or G T respectively. This is more general than the relations covered by [CCGS10], since one can also commit scalars bit-by-bit. In the Appendix C.4, we detail how to build the corresponding SPHF, and prove the soundness of our approach. For the sake of clarity, we focus here to a single equation only, since multiple equations are just conjunctions. We can even consider the simpler equation
since one can lift any ciphertext from G to a ciphertext in G T , setting Z i = e(Y i , A i ), as well as, for j = 1, 2, 3, G i,j = e(g j , A i ) and for j = 1, 2,
, to lift all the group basis elements. Then, one
), e i = h
Encryptions of Z i originally in G T use constant basis elements for j = 1, 2, 3, G i,j = G j = e(g j , g) and for j = 1, 2,
The commitments have been generated in G and G T simultaneously using the m-DLCSCom version, with a common ξ, where the possible combination with the companion ciphertext to the power ε leads to the above C i , thereafter lifted to G T . For the hashing keys, one picks random scalars (λ, (η 
, and sets hk i = (η i , θ i , κ i , λ, µ i ). One then computes the projection keys as hp i = (g
where A i is the constant used to compute Z i = e(Y i , A i ) and to lift ciphertexts from G to G T , or A i = g z i if the ciphertext was already in G T . These evaluations can be computed either from the commitments and the hashing keys, or from the projection keys and the witnesses. We insist on the fact that, whereas the hash values are in G T , the projection keys are in G even if the ciphertexts are initially in G T . We stress again that the projection keys require the knowledge of ξ only: known from the LCSCom commitment or the first part C of the DLCSCom commitment.
5 Language-Authenticated Key Exchange
The Ideal Functionality
We generalize the Password-Authenticated Key Exchange functionality F pake (first provided in [CHK + 05]) to more complex languages: the players agree on a common secret key if and only if they own words that lie in the languages the partners have in mind. More precisely, after an agreement on pub between P i and P j (modeled here by the use of the split functionality, see below), player P i uses a word W i belonging to L i = L R i (pub, priv i ) and it expects its partner P j to use a word W j belonging to the language L j = L R j (pub, priv j ), and vice-versa for P j and P i . We assume relations R i and R j to be specified by the kind of protocol we study (PAKE, Verifierbased PAKE, secret handshakes, . . . ) and so the languages are defined by the additional parameters pub, priv i and priv j only: they both agree on the public part pub, to be possibly parsed in a different way by each player for each language according to the relations. Note however that the respective languages do not need to be the same or to use similar relations: authentication means could be totally different for the 2 players. The key exchange should succeed if and only if the two following pairs of equations hold:
Description. In the initial F pake functionality [CHK + 05], the adversary was given access to a TestPwd-query, which modeled the on-line dictionary attack. But it is known since [BCL + 05] that it is equivalent to use the split functionality model [BCL + 05], generate the NewSession-queries corresponding to the corrupted players and tell the adversary (on behalf of the corrupted player) whether the protocol should succeed or not. Both methods enable the adversary to try a credential for a player (on-line dictionary attack). The second method (that we use here) implies allowing S to ask NewSession-queries on behalf of the corrupted player, and letting it to be aware of the success or failure of the protocol in this case: the adversary learns this information only when it plays on behalf of a player (corruption or impersonation attempt). This is any way an information it would learn at the end of the protocol. We insist that third parties will not learn whether the protocol succeeded or not, as required for secret handshakes. To this aim, the NewKey-query informs in this case the adversary whether the credentials are consistent with the languages or not. In addition, the split functionality model guarantees from the beginning which player is honest and which one is controlled by the adversary. This finally allows us to get rid of the TestPwd-query. The F lake functionality is presented in Figure 2 and the corresponding split functionality sF lake in Figure 3 , where the languages are formally described and compared using the pub and priv parts. The security goal is to show that the best attack for the adversary is a basic trial execution with a credential of its guess or choice: the proof will thus consist in emulating any real-life attack by either a trial execution by the adversary, playing as an honest player would do, but with a credential chosen by the adversary or obtained in any way; or a denial of service, where the adversary is clearly aware that its behavior will make the execution fail.
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The functionality Flake is parametrized by a security parameter k and a public parameter pub for the languages. It interacts with an adversary S and a set of parties P1,. . . ,Pn via the following queries:
• If this is the first NewSession-query with identifier sid, record the tuple (Pi, Pj, Wi, Li, L j , initiator). Send (NewSession; sid, Pi, Pj, pub, initiator) to S and Pj.
• If this is the second NewSession-query with identifier sid and there is a record (Pj, Pi, Wj, Lj, L i , initiator), record the tuple (Pj, Pi, Wj, Lj, L i , initiator, Wi, Li, L j , receiver). Send (NewSession; sid, Pi, Pj, pub, receiver) to S and Pj.
-Key Computation: Upon receiving a query (NewKey : sid) from S, if there is a record of the form (Pi, Pj, Wi, Li, L j , initiator, Wj, Lj, L i , receiver) and this is the first NewKey-query for session sid, then • If (L i = Li and Wi ∈ Li) and (L j = Lj and Wj ∈ Lj), then pick a random key sk of length k and store (sid, sk). In addition, if one player is corrupted, send (sid, success) to the adversary.
• Else, store (sid, ⊥), and send (sid, fail) to the adversary if one player is corrupted. -Key Delivery: Upon receiving a query (SendKey : sid, Pi, sk) from S, then
• if there is a record of the form (sid, sk ), then, if both players are uncorrupted, output (sid, sk ) to Pi. Otherwise, output (sid, sk) to Pi.
• if there is a record of the form (sid, ⊥), then pick a random key sk of length k and output (sid, sk ) to Pi.
Fig. 2. Ideal Functionality Flake
Given the functionality Flake, the split functionality sFlake proceeds as follows:
• Upon receiving (Init, sid, pub i ) from party Pi, send (Init, sid, Pi, pub i ) to the adversary.
• Upon receiving a message (Init, sid, Pi, H, pub, sidH ) from S, where H = {Pi, Pj} is a set of party identities, check that Pi has already sent (Init, sid, pub i ) and that for all recorded (H , pub , sid H ), either H = H , pub = pub and sidH = sid H or H and H are disjoint and sidH = sid H . If so, record the pair (H, pub, sidH ), send (Init, sid, sidH , pub) to Pi, and invoke a new functionality (Flake, sidH , pub) denoted as F (H,pub) lake and with set of honest parties H.
-Computation:
• Upon receiving (Input, sid, m) from party Pi, find the set H such that Pi ∈ H, the public value pub recorded, and forward m to F (H,pub) lake
generates an output m for party Pi ∈ H, send m to Pi. If the output is for Pj / ∈ H or for the adversary, send m to the adversary. Intuition. Using smooth projective hash functions on commitments, one can generically define a LAKE protocol as done in [ACP09] . The basic idea is to make the player commit to their private information (for the expected languages and the owned words), and eventually the smooth projective hash functions will be used to make implicit validity checks of the global relation.
To this aim, we use the commitments and associated smooth projective hash functions as described in Sections 3 and 4. More precisely, all examples of SPHF in Section 4 can be used on extractable commitments divided into one or two parts (the non-equivocable LCSCom or the equivocable DLCSCom commitments, see Figure 1 ). The relations on the committed values will not be explicitly checked, since the values will never be revealed, but will be implicitly checked using SPHF. It is interesting to note that in both cases (one-part or two-part commitment), the projection key will only depend on the first part of the commitment.
As it is often the case in the UC setting, we need the initiator to use stronger primitives than the receiver. They both have to use non-malleable and extractable commitments, but the initiator will use a commitment that is additionally equivocable, the DLCSCom in two parts ((C i , C i ) and Com i = C i · C i ε ), while the receiver will only need the basic LCSCom commitment in one part (Com j = C j ).
As already explained, SPHF will be used to implicitly check whether (L i = L i and W i ∈ L i ) and (L j = L j and W j ∈ L j ). But since in our instantiations private parameters priv and words W will have to be committed, the structure of these commitments will thus be publicly known in advance: commitments of P-elements and S-elements. Section 6 discusses on the languages captured by our definition, and illustrates with some AKE protocols. However, while these P and S sets are embedded in G n from some n, it might be important to prove that the committed values are actually in P and S (e.g., one can have to prove it commits bits, whereas messages Execution between Pi and Pj, with session identifier sid.
-Preliminary Round: each user generates a pair of signing/verification keys (SK, VK) and sends VK together with its contribution to the public part of the language.
We denote by i = (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, pub, VKi, VKj) and by j = (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, pub, VKj, VKi), where pub is the combination of the contributions of the two players. The initiator now uses a word Wi in the language L(pub, priv i ), and the receiver uses a word Wj in the language L(pub, priv j ), possibly re-randomized from their long-term secrets . We assume commitments and associated smooth projective hash functions exist for these languages.
-First Round: user Pi (with random tape ωi) generates a multi-DLCSCom commitment on (priv i , priv j , Wi) in (Ci, C i ), where Wi has been randomized in the language, under the label i. It also computes a Pedersen commitment on C i in C i (with random exponent t). It then sends (Ci, C i ) to Pj; -Second Round: user Pj (with random tape ωj) computes a multi-LCS commitment on (priv j , priv i , Wj) in Comj = Cj, with witness r, where Wj has been randomized in the language, under the label j . It then generates a challenge ε on Ci and hashing/projection keys hki and hp i associated to Ci (which will be associated to the future Comi). It finally signs all the flows using SKj in σj, and sends (Cj, ε, hp i , σj) to Pi; -Third Round: user Pi first checks the signature σj, computes Comi = Ci · C i ε and witness z (from ε and ωi), it generates hashing/projection keys hkj and hp j associated to Comj. It finally signs all the flows using SKi in σi, and sends (C i , t, hp j , σi) to Pj; -Hashing: Pj first checks the signature σi and the correct opening of C i into C i , it computes Comi = Ci · C i ε .
Pi computes Ki and Pj computes Kj as follows:
As explained in Section 1, recall that the languages considered depend on two possibly different relations, namely Li = LR i (pub, priv i ) and Lj = LR j (pub, priv j ), but we omit them for the sake of clarity. We assume they are both self-randomizable.
Recall that the SPHF is constructed in such a way that this projection key does not depend on C i and is indeed associated to the future whole Comi. are first embedded as group elements in G of large order p). This will be an additional language-membership to prove on the commitments. This leads to a very simple protocol described on Figure 4 . Note that if a player wants to make external adversaries think he owns an appropriate word, as it is required for Secret Handshakes, he can still play, but will compute everything with dummy words, and will replace the ProjHash evaluation by a random value, which will lead to a random key at the end.
Security Analysis. Since we have to assume common pub, we make a first round (with flows in each direction) where the players send their contribution, to come up with pub. These flows will also be used to know if there is a player controlled by the adversary (as with the Split Functionality [BCL + 05]). In case the languages have empty pub, these additional flows are not required, since the Split Functionality can be applied on the committed values. The signing key for the receiver is not required anymore since there is one flow only from its side. This LAKE protocol is secure against static corruptions. The proof is provided in the Appendix D, and is in the same vein as the one in [CHK + 05, ACP09]. However, it is a bit more intricate:
-in PAKE, when one is simulating a player, and knows the adversary used the correct password, one simply uses this password for the simulated player. In LAKE, when one knows the language expected by the adversary for the simulated player and has to simulate a successful execution (because of success announced by the NewKey-query), one has to actually include a correct word in the commitment: smooth projective hash functions do not allow the simulator to cheat, equivocability of the commitment is the unique trapdoor, but with a valid word. The languages must allow the simulator to produce a valid word W in L(pub, priv), for any pub and priv ∈ P provided by the adversary or the environment. This will be the case in all the interesting applications of our protocol (see Section 6): if priv defines a Waters' verification key vk = g x , with the master key s such that h = g s , the signing key is sk = h x = vk s , and thus the simulator can sign any message; if such a master key does not exist, one can restrict P, and implicitly check it with the SPHF (the additional language-membership check, as said above). But since a random word is generated by the simulator, we need the real player to derive a random word from his own word, and the language to be self-randomizable.
-In addition, as already noted, our commitment DLCSCom is not formally binding (contrarily to the much less efficient one used in [ACP09]). The adversary can indeed make the extraction give M from C i , whereas Com i will eventually contain M if C i does not encrypt (1 G ) n . However, since the actual value M depends on the random challenge ε, and the language is assumed sparse (otherwise authentication is easy), the protocol will fail: this can be seen as a denial of service from the adversary.
Theorem 1. Our LAKE scheme from Figure 4 realizes the sF lake functionality in the F crs -hybrid model, in the presence of static adversaries, under the DLin assumption and the security of the One-Time Signature.
Actually, from a closer look at the full proof, one can notice that Com j = C j needs to be extractable, but IND − CPA security is enough, which leads to a shorter ciphertext (2 group elements less if one uses a Linear ciphertext instead of LCS). Similarly, one will not have to extract W i from C i when simulating sessions where P i is corrupted. As a consequence, only the private parts of the languages have to be committed to in Com i in the first and third rounds, whereas W i can be encrypted independently with an IND − CPA encryption scheme in the third round only (5 group elements less in the first round, and 2 group elements less in the third round if one uses a Linear ciphertext instead of LCS).
Concrete Instantiations and Comparisons
In this section, we first give some concrete instantiations of several AKE protocols, using our generic protocol of LAKE, and compare the efficiencies of those instantiations.
Possible Languages
As explained above, our LAKE protocol is provably secure for self-randomizable languages only. While this notion may seem quite strong, most of the usual languages fall into it. For example, in a PAKE or a Verifierbased PAKE scheme, the languages consist of a single word and so trivially given a word, each user is able to deduce all the words in the language. One may be a little more worried about Waters Signature in our Secret Handshake, and/or Linear pairing equations. However the self-randomizability of the languages is easy to show:
-Given a Waters signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) over a message m valid under a verification key vk, one is able to randomize the signature into any signature over the same message m valid under the same verification key vk simply by picking a random s and computing σ = (σ 1 · F(m) s , σ 2 · g s ). -For linear pairing equations, with public parameters A i for i = 1, . . . , m and γ i for i = m + 1, . . . , n, and B,
one can randomize the word in the following way:
• If m < n, one simply picks random (X 1 , . . . , X m ), (Z m+1 , . . . , Z n−1 ) and sets
• Else, if m = n > 1, one picks random r 1 , . . . , r n−1 and sets
• Else m = n = 1, this means only one word satisfies the equation. So we already have this word.
As we can see most of the common languages manageable with a SPHF are already self-randomizable. We now show how to use them in concrete instantiations.
Concrete Instantiations
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange. Using our generic construction, we can easily obtain a PAKE protocol, as described on Figure 5 , where we optimize from the generic construction, since pub = ∅, removing the agreement on pub, but still keeping the one-time signature keys (SK i , VK i ) to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks since it has another later flow: P i uses a password W i and expects P j to own the same word, and thus in the language L j = L i = {W i }; P j uses a password W j and expects P i to own the same word, and thus in the language L i = L j = {W j }; The relation is the equality test between priv i and priv j , which both have no Pi uses a password Wi and Pj uses a password Wj. We denote = (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj).
-First Round: Pi (with random tape ωi) first generates a pair of signing/verification keys (SKi, VKi) and a DLCSCom commitment on Wi in (Ci, C i ), under i = ( , VKi). It also computes a Pedersen commitment on C i in C i (with random exponent t). It then sends (VKi, Ci, C i ) to Pj; -Second Round: Pj (with random tape ωj) computes a LCSCom commitment on Wj in Comj = Cj, with witness r, under the label . It then generates a challenge ε on Ci and hashing/projection keys hki and the corresponding hp i for the equality test on Comi ("Comi is a valid commitment of Wj", this only requires the value ξi computable thanks to Ci). It then sends (Cj, ε, hp i ) to Pi; -Third Round: user Pi can compute Comi = Ci · C i ε and witness z (from ε and ωi), it generates hashing/projection keys hkj and hp j for the equality test on Comj. It finally signs all the flows using SKi in σi and sends (C i , t, hp j , σi) to Pj; -Hashing: Pj first checks the signature and the validity of the Pedersen commitment (thanks to t), it computes Comi = Ci · C i ε . Pi computes Ki and Pj computes Kj as follows:
As the word W i , the language private parameters priv i of a user and priv j of the expected language for the other user are the same, each user can commit in the protocol to only one value: its password. We kept the general description and notations in Figure 5 , but C j can be a simply IND − CPA encryption scheme. It is quite efficient and relies on the DLin assumption, with DLCS for (C i , C i ) and thus 10 group elements, but a Linear encryption for C j and thus 3 group elements. Projection keys are both 2 group elements. Globally, P i sends 13 groups elements plus 1 scalar, a verification key and a one-time signature, while P j sends 5 group elements and 1 scalar: 18 group elements and 2 scalars in total. We can of course instantiate it with the CramerShoup and ElGamal variants, under the DDH assumption: P i sends 8 groups elements plus 1 scalar, a verification key and a one-time signature, while P j sends 3 group elements and 1 scalar (all group elements can be in the smallest group): 11 group elements and 2 scalars in total.
Verifier-based PAKE. The above scheme can be modified into an efficient PAKE protocol that is additionally secure against server compromise: the so-called verifier-based PAKE, where the client owns a password pw, while the server knows a verifier only, such as g pw , so that in case of break-in to the server, the adversary will not immediately get all the passwords.
To this aim, as usually done, one first does a PAKE with g pw as common password, then asks the client to additionally prove it can compute the Diffie-Hellman value h pw for a basis h chosen by the server. Ideally, we could implement this trick, where the client P j just considers the equality test between the g pw and the value committed by the server for the language L i = L j , while the server P i considers the equality test with (g pw , h pw ), where h is sent as its contribution to the public part of the language by the server L i = L j . Since the server chooses h itself, it chooses it as h = g α , for an ephemeral random α, and can thus compute h pw = (g pw ) α . On its side, the client can compute this value since it knows pw. The client could thus commit to (g pw , h pw ), in order to prove its knowledge of pw, whereas the server could just commit to g pw . Unfortunately, from the extractability of the server commitment, one would just get g pw , which is not enough to simulate the client.
To make it in a provable way, the server chooses an ephemeral h as above, and they both run the previous PAKE protocol with (g pw , h pw ) as common password, and mutually checked: h is seen as the pub part, hence the preliminary flows are required.
Credential-Authenticated Key Exchange. In [CCGS10], the authors proposed instantiations of the CAKE primitive for conjunctions of atomic policies that are defined algebraically by relations of the form
where the g j 's are elements of an abelian group and F j 's are integer polynomials in the variables committed by the users.
The core of their constructions relies on their practical UC zero-knowledge proof. There is no precise instantiation of such proof, but it is very likely to be inefficient. Their proof technique indeed requires to transform the underlying Σ-protocols into corresponding Ω-protocols [GMY06] by verifiably encrypting the witness. An Ω-protocol is a Σ-protocol with the additional property that it admits a polynomial-time straight-line extractor.
Since the witnesses are scalars in their algebraic relations, their approach requires either inefficient bit-per-bit encryption of these witnesses or Paillier encryption in which case the problem of using group with different orders in the representation and in the encryption requires additional overhead.
Even when used with Σ-protocols, their PAKE scheme without UC-security, requires at least two proofs of knowledge of representations that involve at least 30 group elements (if we assume the encryption to be linear Cramer Shoup), and some extra for the last proof of existence (cf. [CKS11]), where our PAKE requires less than 20 group elements. Anyway they say, their PAKE scheme is less efficient than [CHK + 05], which needed 6 rounds and around 30 modular exponentiations per user, while our efficient PAKE requires less than 40 exponentiations, in total, in only 3 rounds. Our scheme is therefore more efficient than the scheme from [CHK + 05] for the same security level (i.e. UC-security with static corruptions).
Secret-Handshakes. We can also instantiate a (linkable) Secret Handshakes protocol, using our scheme with two different languages: P i will commit to a valid signature σ i on a message m i (his identity for example), under a private verification key vk i , and expects P j to commit to a valid signature on a message m j under a private verification key vk j ; but P j will do analogously with a signature σ j on m j under vk j , while expecting a signature on m i under vk i . The public parts of the signature (the second component) are sent in clear with the commitments.
In a regular Secret Handshakes both users should use the same languages. But here, we have a more general situation (called dynamic matching in [AKB07]): the two participants will have the same final value if and only if they both belong to the organization the other expects. If one lies, our protocol guarantees no information leakage. Furthermore, the semantic security of the session is even guaranteed with respect to the authorities, in a forward-secure way (this property is also achieved in [JL09] but in a weaker security model). Finally, our scheme supports revocation and can handle roles as in [AKB07] .
Standard secret handshakes, like [AKB07], usually work with credentials delivered by a unique authority, this would remove our need for a hidden verification key, and private part of the language. Both users would only need to commit to signatures on their identity/credential, and show that they are valid. This would require a dozen of group elements with our approach. Their construction requires only 4 elements under BDH, however it relies on the asymmetric Waters IBE with only two elements, whereas the only security proof known for such IBE [Duc10] requires an extra term in G 2 which would render their technique far less efficient, as several extra terms would be needed to expect a provably secure scheme. While sometimes less effective, our LAKE approach can manage Secret Handshakes, and provide additional functionalities, like more granular control on the credential as part of them can be expressly hidden by both the users. More precisely, we provide affiliationhiding property and let third parties unaware of the success/failure of the protocol.
Unlinkable Secret-Handshakes. Moving the users' identity from the public pub part to individual private priv part, and combining our technique with [BPV12], it is also possible to design an unlinkable Secret Handshakes protocol [JL09] with practical efficiency. It illustrates the case where committed values have to be proven in a strict subset of G, as one has to commit to bits: the signed message M is now committed and not in clear, it thus has to be done bit-by-bit since the encoding G does not allow algebraic operations with the content to apply the Waters function on the message. It is thus possible to prove the knowledge of a Waters signature on a private message (identity) valid under a private verification key. Additional relations can be required on the latter to make authentication even stronger. 
A Preliminaries

A.1 Formal Definitions of the Primitives
We first recall the definitions of the basic tools, with the security notions with success/advantage that all depend on a security parameter (which is omitted here for simplicity of notation).
Hash Function Family. A hash function family H is a family of functions H K from {0, 1} * to a fixed-length output, either {0, 1} k or Z p . Such a family is said collision-resistant if for any adversary A on a random function H K $ ← H, it is hard to find a collision. More precisely, we denote
Labeled encryption scheme. A labeled public-key encryption scheme is defined by four algorithms:
, where k is the security parameter, generates the global parameters param of the scheme; -KeyGen(param) generates a pair of keys, the encryption key ek and the decryption key dk; -Encrypt( , ek, m; r) produces a ciphertext c on the input message m ∈ M under the label and encryption key ek, using the random coins r; -Decrypt( , dk, c) outputs the plaintext m encrypted in c under the label , or ⊥.
An encryption scheme E should satisfy the following properties -Correctness: for all key pair (ek, dk), any label , all random coins r and all messages m, Decrypt( , dk, Encrypt( , ek, m; r)) = m.
-Indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks:
this security notion can be formalized by the following security game, where the adversary A keeps some internal state between the various calls FIND and GUESS, and makes use of the oracle ODecrypt:
• ODecrypt( , c): This oracle outputs the decryption of c under the label and the challenge decryption key dk. The input queries ( , c) are added to the list CT .
The advantages are
Labeled commitment scheme. A labeled commitment scheme is defined by three algorithms: The commitment algorithm can be interactive between the sender and the received, but the hiding and the binding properties should still hold. Several additional properties are sometimes required:
-Extractability: an indistinguishable Setup procedure also outputs a trapdoor that allows a extractor to get the committed value m from any commitment c. More precisely, if c can be open in a valid way, the extractor can get this value from the commitment. -Equivocability: an indistinguishable Setup procedure also outputs a trapdoor that allows a simulator to generate commitments that can thereafter be open in any way. -Non-Malleability: it should be hard, from a commitment c to generate a new commitment c = c whose committed values are in relation.
It is well-known that any IND-CCA encryption scheme leads to a non-malleable and extractable commitment scheme [GL03].
Signature scheme. A signature scheme is defined by four algorithms:
, where k is the security parameter, generates the global parameters param of the scheme; -KeyGen(param) generates a pair of keys, the verification key vk and the signing key sk; -Sign(sk, m; s) produces a signature σ on the input message m, under the signing key sk, and using the random coins s; -Verif(vk, m, σ) checks whether σ is a valid signature on m, w.r.t. the public key vk; it outputs 1 if the signature is valid, and 0 otherwise.
A signature scheme S should satisfy the following properties -Correctness: for all key pair (vk, sk), all random coins s and all messages m, Verif(vk, m, Sign(sk, m; s)) = 1.
-Existential unforgeability under (adaptive) chosen-message attacks: this security notion can be formalized by the following security game, where it makes use of the oracle OSign:
• OSign(m): This oracle outputs a valid signature on m under the signing key sk. The input queries m are added to the list SM.
The success probabilities are
Smooth Projective Hash Function. A smooth projective hash function system is defined on a language L, with five algorithms:
The correctness of the scheme assures that if W is in L with w as a witness, then the two ways to compute the hash values give the same result: Hash(hk, L, W ) = ProjHash(hp, L, W, w). In our setting, these hash values will belong to a group G. The security is defined through two different notions, the smoothness and the pseudo-randomness properties, where we use the distribution ∆(L, W ) = {(hk, hp), hk ← HashKG(L), hp ← ProjKG(hk, L, W )}:
16
-the smoothness property guarantees that if W ∈ L, the hash value is statistically indistinguishable from a random element, even knowing hp:
We define by Adv smooth the statistical distance between the two distributions. -the pseudo-randomness property guarantees that even for a word W ∈ L, but without the knowledge of a witness w, the hash value is computationally indistinguishable from a random element, even knowing hp:
We define by Adv pr (t) the computational distance between the two distributions for t-time distinguishers.
A.2 Computational Assumptions
The three classical assumptions we use along this paper are: the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH), the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and the decisional Linear (DLin) assumptions. Our constructions essentially rely on the DLin assumption, that implies the CDH. It is the most general since it (presumably) holds in many groups, with or without pairing. Some more efficient instantiations will rely on the DDH assumption but in more specific groups.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)). The Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption says that, in a group (p, G, g), when we are given (g a , g b ) for unknown random a, b $ ← Z p , it is hard to compute g ab . We define by Succ can be tuned to a labeled public-key encryption scheme:
-Setup(1 k ) generates a group G of order p, with three independent generators (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 )
p , and sets, for i = 1, 2, c i = g
, and h i = g
. It also chooses a hash function H K in a collision-resistant hash family H (or simply a Universal One-Way Hash Function). The encryption key is ek = (c 1 , c 2 ,
-Encrypt( , ek, M ; r, s), for a message M ∈ G and two random scalars r, s
, where v is computed afterwards with ξ = H K ( , u, e). -Decrypt( , dk, C = (u, e, v)): one first computes ξ = H K ( , u, e) and checks whether u 
for M ∈ {0, 1} k , and an extra generator h $ ← G. The global parameters param consist of all these elements (p, G, g, G T , e, f , h).
-KeyGen(param) chooses a random scalar x $ ← Z p , which defines the public verification key as vk = g x , and the secret signing key as sk = h x . -Sign(sk, M ; s) outputs, for some random s
This scheme is existentially unforgeable against (adaptive) chosen-message attacks [GMR88] under the CDH assumption.
A.4 Some Primitives in Asymmetric Groups -Based on DDH
Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. The Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98] can be tuned into a labeled public-key encryption scheme:
p , and sets, c = g
2 , and h = g z 1 . It also chooses a collision-resistant hash function H K in a hash family H (or simply a Universal One-Way Hash Function). The encryption key is ek = (g 1 , g 2 , c, d, h, H K ).
-Encrypt( , ek, M ; r), for a message M ∈ G and a random scalar r ∈ Z p , the ciphertext is C = ( , u = (g r 1 , g r 2 ), e = M · h r , v = (cd ξ ) r ), where v is computed afterwards with ξ = H K ( , u, e). -Decrypt( , dk, C): one first computes ξ = H K ( , u, e) and checks whether u 
-KeyGen(param) chooses a random scalar x $ ← Z p , which defines the public vk = g x 1 , and the secret sk = h x 1 . -Sign(sk, M ; s) outputs, for some random s
. -Verif(vk, M, σ) checks whether e(σ 1 , g 1 ) = e(h 1 , vk) · e(F(M ), σ 2,2 ), and e(σ 2,1 , g 1 ) = e(g 1 , σ 2,2 ).
This scheme is unforgeable under the following variant of the CDH assumption:
Definition 5 (The Advanced Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH + )). In a pairing-friendly environment (p, G 1 , g 1 , G 2 , g 1 , G T , e). The CDH + assumption states that given (g 1 , g 1 , g a 1 , g a 1 , g b 1 ), for random a, b ∈ Z p , it is hard to compute g ab 1 .
B Multi Double Linear Cramer-Shoup Commitment
B.1 Multi Double Linear Cramer-Shoup (n − DLCS) Encryption
We can extend the encryption scheme implicitly presented in Section 3 to vectors (M i , N i ) i=1,...,n , partially IND-CCA protected, with a common ξ. It of course also includes the n − LCS scheme on vectors (M i ) i , when ignoring the C part, which is already anyway the case for the decryption oracle:
. It also chooses a collision-resistant hash function H K . The encryption key is ek = (c 1 , c 2 , d 1 , d 2 , h 1 , h 2 , H K ).
-Encrypt( , ek, M ; r, s), for a vector M ∈ G n and two vectors r, s ∈ Z n p , computes
with the v i computed afterwards with ξ = H K ( , u 1 , . . . , u n , e 1 , . . . , e n ). -Encrypt ( , ek, N , ξ; a, b), for a vector N ∈ G n and two vectors a, b ∈ Z n p , computes
where the γ i 's are computed with the above ξ = H K ( , u 1 , . . . , u n , e 1 , . . . , e n ), hence the additional input. One can use both simultaneously: on input ( , ek, M , N ; r, s, a, b), the global encryption algorithm first calls Encrypt( , ek, M ; r, s) and to get C and ξ, and then calls Encrypt ( , ek, N , ξ; a, b) to get C . -Decrypt( , dk, C, C ): one first parses C = (C 1 , . . . , C n ) and C = (C 1 , . . . , C n ), where C i = (u i , e i , v i ) and C i = (α i , β i , γ i ), for i = 1, . . . , n, computes ξ = H K ( , u 1 , . . . , u n , e 1 , . . . , e n ) and checks whether, for i = 1, . . . , n, u N = (N 1 , . . . , N n ) ). Otherwise, one outputs ⊥.
-PDecrypt( , dk, C): is a partial decryption algorithm that does as above but working on the C part only to get M = (M 1 , . . . , M n ) or ⊥.
DLCS denotes the particular case where n = 1: DLCS( , ek, M, N ; r, s, a, b) = (C, C ), with
where ξ = H K ( , u, e).
B.2 Security of the Multi Double Linear Cramer Shoup Encryption
Security model. This scheme is indistinguishable against partial-decryption chosen-ciphertext attacks, where a partial-decryption oracle only is available, but even when we allow the adversary to choose M and N in two different steps (see the security game below), under the DLin assumption and if one uses a collision-resistant hash function H. Indistinguishability against partial-decryption chosen-ciphertext attacks for vectors, in two steps: this security notion can be formalized by the following security game, where the adversary A keeps some internal state between the various calls FIND M , FIND N and GUESS. In the first stage FIND M , it receives the encryption key ek; in the second stage FIND N , it receives the encryption of M b : C * = Encrypt( , ek, M b ); in the last stage GUESS it receives the encryption of N b : C * = Encrypt ( , ek, ξ * , N b ), where ξ * is the value involved in C. During all these stages, it can make use of the oracle ODecrypt( , C), that outputs the decryption of C under the label and the challenge decryption key dk, using PDecrypt( , dk, C). The input queries ( , C) are added to the list CT .
The advantages are, where q d is the number of decryption queries:
Theorem 6. The Multiple n − DLCS encryption scheme is IND-PD-CCA if H is a collision-resistant hash function family, under the DLin assumption in G:
Corollary 7. The Multiple n − LCS encryption scheme is IND-CCA if H is a collision-resistant hash function family, under the DLin assumption in G.
Security proof. Let us be given a DLin challenge (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , u 1 = g r 1 , u 2 = g s 2 , u 3 = g t 3 ), for which we have to decide whether (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) is a linear tuple in basis (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ), and thus t = r + s mod p, or a random one. From an IND-PD-CCA adversary A against the encryption scheme, we built a DLin distinguisher B. The latter first uses (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) as the global parameters. It also picks x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , z 1 , z 2 , z 3 $ ← Z 9 p and sets c i = g
3 , for i = 1, 2. It chooses a collision-resistant hash function H K and provides A with the encryption key ek = (c 1 , c 2 ,
-In the initial game G 0 ,
• A's decryption queries are answered by B, simply using the decryption key dk.
• When A submits the first challenge vectors M 0 = (M 0,1 , . . . , M 0,n ) and M 1 = (M 1,1 , . . . , M 1,n ), with a label * , B chooses a random bit b $ ← {0, 1} and encrypts M b :
2 ) s * i ), for i = 1, . . . , n, where the v * i 's are computed with ξ * = H K ( * , u * 1 , . . . , u * n , e * 1 , . . . , e * n ), and C * = (C * 1 , . . . , C * n ).
• When A submits the second challenge vectors N 0 = (N 0,1 , . . . , N 0,n ) and N 1 = (N 1,1 , . . . , N 1,n ),
. . , n, where the γ * i 's are computed with the above ξ * = H K ( * , u * 1 , . . . , u * n , e * 1 , . . . , e * n ), and C * = (C * 1 , . . . , C * n ). -In game G 1 , where we assume t = r + s mod p, to encrypt the challenge vectors M b and N b , B does as above, except for C * 1 :
), which actually defines r * 1 = r and s * 1 = s.
The challenge ciphertexts are identical to the encryptions of M b and N b in G 0 . Decryption queries are still answered the same way. Hence the gap between this game and the previous game is 0.
-In game G 2 , we now assume that t $ ← Z p (a random tuple). First, we have to check that the incorrect computation of v * 1 does not impact the probability to reject invalid ciphertexts, then we prove that e * 1 is totally independent of M b,1 .
1. About the validity checks, u
. . , u n , e 1 , . . . , e n ), three cases can appear with respect to the challenge ciphertext C * = ((u * 1 , e * 1 , v * 1 ), . . . , (u * n , e * n , v * n )): (a) ( , u 1 , e 1 , . . . , u n , e n ) = ( * , u * 1 , e * 1 , . . . , u * n , e * n ), then necessarily, for some i, v i = v * i , then the check on index i will fail since one value only is acceptable; (b) ( , u 1 , e 1 , . . . , u n , e n ) = ( * , u * 1 , e * 1 , . . . , u * n , e * n ), but ξ = ξ * , then the adversary has generated a collision for the hash function H K . , u 1 , e 1 , . . . , u n , e n ) = ( * , u * 1 , e * 1 , . . . , u * n , e * n ), and ξ = ξ * : the ciphertext should be accepted iff
(c) (
, for i = 1, . . . , n. To make it acceptable, if we denote g 2 = g β 2 1 and g 3 = g β 3 1 , we indeed have
with in addition,
The 2n − 1 last relations are thus linearly dependent with the 4 above relations, hence remains the useful relations
One can note that for v * 1 to be predictable, because of the x 1 , x 2 and y 1 , y 2 components, we need to have (5) = r (1) + s (3) + rξ * (2) + sξ * (4), and then t = r + s, which is not the case, hence v * 1 looks random: in this game, v * 1 is perfectly uniformly distributed in G. Furthermore, for any v i in the decryption query, if
is not a linear triple, then it should be such that log g 1 v i = r x 1 + s β 2 x 2 + t β 3 x 3 + r ξy 1 + s ξβ 2 y 2 + t ξβ 3 y 3 .
Since the matrix
then the correct value for v i is unpredictable: an invalid ciphertext will be accepted with probability 1/p. 2. Let us now consider the mask u 3 : its discrete logarithm in basis g 1 is rz 1 + sβ 2 z 2 + tβ 3 z 3 , whereas the informations about (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) are h 1 = g   has determinant β 2 β 3 (t − r − s)(t − r − s ) = 0, then the value of the mask is unpredictable: in this game, e * 1 is perfectly uniformly distributed in G.
Since the unique difference between the two games is the linear/random tuple, unless a collision is found for H K (probability bounded by Succ coll H (t)) and or an invalid ciphertext is accepted (probability bounded by q d /p), then Pr
-In game G 3 , to encrypt the challenge vectors M b and N b , B does as above, except for C * 1 : for a random
3 ), e * 1 $ ← G, and v * 1 $ ← G. As just explained, this is perfectly indistinguishable with the previous game:
-In game G 4 , to encrypt the challenge vectors M b and N b , B does as above, except for C * : for a random vector t * $ ← Z n p , for i = 2, . . . , n:
Thus replacing sequentially the C * i 's by random ones, as we've just done, we obtain
-In game G 5 , to encrypt the challenge vectors M b and N b , B does as above, except for C * : for a random vector c * $ ← Z n p , for i = 1, . . . , n:
In this last game, it is clear that Pr
is not used anymore:
which concludes the proof.
B.3 Double Linear Cramer-Shoup (DLCS) Commitment
Recently, Lindell [Lin11] proposed a highly efficient UC commitment. Our commitment strongly relies on it, but does not need to be UC secure. We will then show that the decommitment check can be done in an implicit way with an appropriate smooth projective hash function. Basically, the technique consists in encrypting M in C = (u, e, v) = LCS( , M ; r, s), also getting ξ = H K ( , u, e), and then encrypting 1 G in C = LCS * ( , 1 G , ξ; a, b), with the same ξ. For a given challenge ε, we can see C ·C ε = LCS * ( , M, ξ; r +εa, s+εb), where the computations are done component-wise, as an encryption of M , still using the same above ξ. Note that Lindell [Lin11] used C ε ·C , but our choice seems more natural, since we essentially re-randomize the initial encryption C, but we have to take care of choosing ε = 0. It makes use of an equivocable commitment: the Pedersen commitment [Ped92].
-Setup(1 k ) generates a group G of order p, with two independent generators g and ζ; -Commit(m; r), for a message m This commitment is computationally binding under the discrete logarithm assumption: two different openings (m, r) and (m , r ) for a commitment c, leads to the discrete logarithm of ζ in basis g, that is equal to (m − m) · (r − r ) −1 mod p. Granted this logarithm as additional information from the setup, one can equivocate any dummy commitment.
Description. Our n-message vector commitment, which includes labels, is depicted on Figure 6 , where the computation between vectors are component-wise. We assume we commit vectors of group elements, but they can come from the reversible transformation G. Note that for this commitment scheme, we can use ε = (ε, . . . , ε). For the version with SPHF implicit verification, according to the language, one can have to use independent components ε $ ← (Z * p ) n .
-Setup(1 k ): A group G of prime order p, with ten independent generators (g1, g2, g3, h1, h2, c1, c2, d1, d2, ζ) $ ← G 10 , a collision-resistant hash function HK , and possibly an additional reversible mapping G from {0, 1} k to G to commit to bit-strings. One can denote ek = (c1, c2, d1, d1, h1, h2, HK ); -Commit( , M ; r, s, a, b, t): for (r, s, a, b, t)
Analysis. Let us briefly show the properties of this commitment:
-Hiding property: M is committed in the Pedersen commitment C , that does not leak any information, and in the n − LCS encryption C, that is indistinguishable, even with access to the decryption oracle (extractability). This also implies non-malleability. -Binding property: M , after having been hashed, is committed in the Pedersen commitment C , that is computationally binding. -Extractability: using the decryption key of the LCS encryption scheme, one can extract M from C. Later, one has to open the ciphertext CC ε with M , which can be different from M in the case that C contains , and update χ and t, using the Pedersen trapdoor for equivocability.
To allow an implicit verification with SPHF, one omits to send M and z, but make an implicit proof of their existence. Therefore, M cannot be committed/verified in C , which has an impact on the binding property: C and C are not binded to a specific M , even in a computational way. However, as said above, if C contains a ciphertext C of N = (1 G ) n , the actual committed value will depend on ε: M = M N ε has its i-component, where
n , all these i-component where N i = 1 G are randomly and independently distributed in G. Then, if the committed value has to satisfy a specific relation, with very few solutions, M will unlikely satisfy it.
C Smooth Projective Hash Functions on More Complex Languages
C.1 Basic Relations
We first consider Diffie-Hellman pairs and linear tuples and show we can make proof of membership without using any pairing.
DDH pairs. Let us assume a user is given two elements g, h and then wants to send G = g a , H = h a for a chosen a and prove that the pair (G, H) is well-formed with respect to (g, h). We thus consider the language of Diffie Hellman tuples (g, h, G = g a , H = h a ), with a as a witness.
As done in [CS98], we define a projection key hp = g x 1 h x 2 by picking two random scalars x 1 , x 2 $ ← Z p , which define the secret hashing key hk = (x 1 , x 2 ). One can then compute the hash value in two different ways: , (g, h, G, H) ). Such SPHF is smooth: this can be seen by proceeding like in the Cramer-Shoup proof. Given hp = g α , h = g β , G = g a and H = h a , the hash value is g γ that satisfies:
The determinant of this matrix is ∆ = β(a − a), that is zero if and only if we do have a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. Otherwise, from hp, γ is perfectly hidden, from an information theoretical point of view, and so is Hash(hk, (g, h, G, H)) too.
DLin tuples. Let us consider three generators u, v, w, and a tuple U = u r , V = v s , W = w t one wants to prove be linear (i.e. t = r + s). We first define two projection keys hp 1 = u x 1 w x 3 , hp 2 = v x 2 w x 3 , for random scalars that define the secret hashing key hk = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ). One can then compute the hash value in two different ways:
Once again this SPHF can be shown to be smooth: given hp 1 = u α , hp 2 = u β , v = u γ , w = u δ , the hash value is u λ that satisfies:
The determinant of this matrix is ∆ = γδ(t − s − r), that is zero if and only if we do have a valid linear tuple.
C.2 Smooth Projective Hashing on Commitments
We now show that our commitments LCS or DLCS are well-suited for a use together with smooth projective hash functions: instead of publishing z at the decommit phase, in order to check whether C · C ε ? = LCS * ( , M, ξ; z r , z s ) (with ε = 0 in the LCS non-equivocable case, or with ε = 0 in the DLCS case), one uses a smooth projective hash function to "implicitly" prove the existence of a witness that the commitment actually contains the claimed (or assumed) value M . We will thereafter be able to use this primitive in Language-Authenticated Key Exchange, for complex languages.
Smooth projective hash functions. We thus have a commitment, either C or C · C ε , but we use in both cases the notation C, and want to check whether there exists z = (z r , z s ) such that
where we denote
We note here that all the bases g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , h 1 , h 2 but also v 1 , v 2 are known as soon as ξ is known (the C part of the DLCS commitment). One then generates hk = (η, θ, κ, λ, µ) $ ← Z 5 p , and derives the projection key that depends on ξ only:
. Then, one can compute the hash value:
Security properties. Let us claim and prove the security properties:
Theorem 8. Under the DLin assumption, the above smooth projective hash function is both smooth and pseudorandom:
Proof. For the correctness, one can easily check that if C contains M = M , then H = H : , and ∆ = log g 1 (M /M ):
The information leaked by the projected key is log g 1 hp 1 = η+β 3 κ+ρ 1 λ+δ 1 µ and log g 1 hp 2 = β 2 θ+β 3 κ+ρ 2 λ+δ 2 µ, which leads to the matrix
One remarks that if z t = z r + z s mod p, then the three rows are not linearly dependent even considering the 3 first components only, and then H is unpredictable. Hence, we can assume that z t = z r + z s mod p. The third row must thus be the first multiplied by z r plus the second multiplied by z s : ρ 2 z s = ∆ + ρ 2 z s mod p and z s = z s mod p, which implies z s = s and ∆ = 0, otherwise, H remains unpredictable.
As a consequence, if C is not a correct encryption of W , H is perfectly unpredictable in G:
Pseudo-Randomness: we've just shown that if C is not a correct encryption of M , then H is statistically unpredictable. Let us be given a triple (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) together with another triple u = (
. We choose random exponents (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), and for i = 1, 2, we set c i = g
). If c = a + b mod p (i.e., u is a linear tuple in basis g), then C is a valid encryption of M , otherwise this is not, and we can apply the smoothness property:
Adv
C.3 Single Equation
Let us assume that we have Y i committed in G, in c i , for i = 1, . . . , m and Z i committed in G T , in D i , for i = m + 1, . . . , n, and we want to show they simultaneously satisfy
where A i ∈ G, B ∈ G T , and z i ∈ Z p are public. As already said, the commitment can either be the LCS or the DLCS version, but they both come up to a ciphertext C with the appropriate random coins z:
. . , m where, for j = 1, 2, 3, G i,j = e(g j , A i ) and for j = 1, 2,
. . , n where, for j = 1, 2, 3, G i,j = e(g j , g) and for j = 1, 2,
where g is a generator of G and ξ = H K (u 1 , . . . , u m , U m+1 , . . . , U n , e 1 , . . . , e m , E m+1 , . . . , E n ): G-elements are encrypted under ek d 2 ) ), and G T -element are encrypted under 1 , D i,2 ) ). Note that an additional label can be included in the computation of ξ.
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For the hashing keys, one picks scalars (λ, (η i , θ i , κ i , µ i ) , θ i , κ i , λ, µ i ) . One then computes the projection keys as hp i = (g
The hash value is
which can be computed either from the commitments and the hashing keys, or from the projection keys and the witnesses. We prove below the smoothness, but first extend it even more to several equations.
C.4 Multiple Equations
Let us assume that we have
. . , n, and we want to show they simultaneously satisfy
where A k,i ∈ G, B k ∈ G T , and z k,i ∈ Z p , as well as A k ⊆ {1, . . . , m} and B k ⊆ {m + 1, . . . , n} are public. As above, from the commitments, one derives the global ξ, which can also involves the label , and one can also derive the commitments in G T , C k,i that correspond to the encryption of
, where the capital letters X k,i,j correspond to the lower-case letters x j paired with A k,i . For the hashing keys, one picks scalars (λ,
..,n , {ε k } k=1,...,t ). We insist on the fact that the ε k 's have to be sent after the commitments have been sent, or at least committed to (such as C and C which prevent from any modification). One then computes the projection keys as hp i = (g
, together with ε k . The associated projection keys in G T are HP k,i = (e(hp i,1 , A k,i ), e(hp i,2 , A k,i )), for k = 1, . . . , t and i = 1, . . . , n, where A k,i = g z k,i for i = m + 1, . . . , n, together with ε k . The hash function and the projective hash function are defined as:
which can be computed either from the commitments and the hashing keys, or from the projection keys and the witnesses. They lead to the same values H = H if
= B k , which means that all the equations are simultaneously satisfied; -λ = 0, which is quite unlikely;
i /B k , which is also quite unlikely since the ∆ k 's are fixed before the ε k 's are known.
C.5 Security Analysis
Smoothness. In this section, first we prove the smoothness of the SPHF built right before. For k = 1, this proves the smoothness of the SPHF built to handle variables in one linear pairing equation. The list of commitments C = (C 1 , . . . , C n ), which possibly results from the multiplication by the companion ciphertext when using the equivocable variant, should be considered in the language if and only if:
-the commitments are all valid Linear Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts (in either G or G T ), with the common and fixed ξ; -the plaintexts satisfy the linear pairing product equations.
Let us assume that one of the commitments is not a valid ciphertext, this means that for some index i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the ciphertext (
2 ) s i . Then, the contribution of this ciphertext in the hash value is (U
, where ε i = k,i∈A k ∪B k ε k , knowing the projection keys that reveal, at most,
1 . But even if all the discrete logarithms were known, and also λ, one has to guess
The first 3-column matrix has determinant is x 2 x 3 (t i − (r i + s i )), that is non-zero as soon as t i = r i + s i . In this case, there is no way to guess the correct value better than by chance: 1/p. If t i = (r i + s i ), the third line is linearly dependent with the 2 first, if and only if z i = r i (y 1 + ξy 3 ) + s i (y 2 + ξy 4 ). Otherwise, one has no better way to guess the value than by chance either. Hence the smoothness of this hash function when one commitment is not valid. About the equation validity, the E i 's of the involved ciphertexts contain plaintexts Y i or Z i , and contribute to the hash value: from the projection keys, the k-th equation contributes to
As soon as one of the equations is not satisfied, one of the α k is different from 1. Since the ε k 's are unknown at the commitment time, one cannot make the α k to compensate themselves, but by chance: if one equation is not satisfied, the probability that k α ε k k = 1 is 1/p. Except this negligible case, ( k α ε k k ) λ is totally unpredictable since λ is random.
Pseudo-randomness. The pseudo-randomness can be proven under the DLin assumption: with invalid ciphertexts, the smoothness guarantees unpredictability; without the witnesses, one cannot distinguish a valid ciphertext from an invalid ciphertext.
C.6 Asymmetric Setting
Our approach has been presented in the symmetric setting (at least when pairing are required). We can do the same in asymmetric bilinear groups, with e : G 1 × G 2 → G T , and even more efficiently, using the CramerShoup encryption scheme, and the analogous n-message commitment scheme, which security relies on the DDH assumption in either G 1 or G 2 . In this setting, our methodology can handle linear pairing product equations:
where A j , B i , g T are public values, in G 1 , G 2 and G T respectively, and X i , Y j , Z k are the unknown values, committed in G 1 , G 2 and G T respectively.
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D Security of the LAKE Protocol: Proof of Theorem 1
For the sake of simplicity, we give in Figure 7 an explicit version of the protocol described in Figure 4 . We omit the additional verification that all the committed values are in the correct subsets P and S, since in the proof below we will always easily guarantee this membership. The proof heavily relies on the properties of the commitments and smooth projective hash functions given in Sections 3, 4 and Appendix B.
Initiator Pi
Receiver Pj
Sets the session as accepted and uses ski as a shared key flow-three
∈ Lj sets skj random. Otherwise, does the following:
Sets the session as accepted and uses skj as a shared key Fig. 7 . Description of the language authenticated key exchange protocol for players (Pi, ssid), with index i, message Wi ∈ Li = L(pub, priv i ) and expected language for Pj L j = L(pub, priv j ) and (Pj, ssid), with index j, message Wj ∈ Lj = L(pub, priv j ) and expected language for Pi L i = L(pub, priv i ). The label is = (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj). The random values used in the commitments (witnesses) are all included in (ri, r i ) and rj.
D.1 Notations
The protocol is played between an initiator, denoted to as P i , and a receiver, P j . Each player P k owns a public part pub k of a language. Those two public parts pub i and pub j will combine to create the common public part pub of the language used in the protocol. Player P k also owns a private part priv k and a word W k ∈ L(pub, priv k ) 1 . It rerandomizes this word W k into a word V k still in L(pub, priv k ): we assume the languages used to be selfrandomizable, which allows such a rerandomization. We need three different types of commitments for this protocol:
-EqCommit is an equivocable commitment, such as Pedersen [Ped92], used to engage P i on its further committed values C i and C i with randomness t i : C i = EqCommit((C i , C i ); t i ); -EqExtCommit is a labeled equivocable and extractable commitment, used by P i to commit to its private values (used in the smooth projective hash function) and asking P j to send a challenge value ε.
It is based on a double encryption scheme (Enc i and Enc i ) that is partial-decryption chosen-ciphertext secure (the latter one being strongly related to the former), verifying the following properties, if we denote by + and · two group laws adapted to the schemes:
In the particular cases of (multi) Double-Cramer-Shoup or Double-Linear-Cramer-Shoup, C i is a real ciphertext with the correct ξ value, to guarantee non-malleability, but C i and Com i use the ξ value of C i . This is the reason why projection keys can be computed as soon as C i is known. -ExtCommit is a labeled extractable commitment, used by P j to commit to its private values (used in the smooth projective hash function). It is based on a chosen-ciphertext secure encryption scheme Enc j which can be equal to Enc i or different:
Again, note that the projected keys of the smooth projective hash functions depend on C i and C j only, and do not need Com i , justifying it can be computed by P j in (R2), before having actually received C i and thus being able to compute Com i .
D.2 Sketch of Proof
The proof follows that of [CHK + 05] and [ACP09], but with a different approach since we want to prove that the best attack the adversary can perform is to play as an honest player would do with a chosen credential (pub i , priv i , priv j , W i ) -when trying to impersonate P i -or (pub j , priv j , priv i , W j ) -when trying to impersonate P j -. In order to prove Theorem 1, we need to construct, for any real-world adversary A (controlling some dishonest parties), an ideal-world adversary S (interacting with dummy parties and the split functionality sF lake ) such that no environment Z can distinguish between an execution with A in the real world and S in the ideal world with non-negligible probability. The split functionality sF lake is defined in Section 5, following [BCL + 05]. In particular, we assume that at the beginning of the protocol, S receives from it the contribution pub i of P i to the public language pub as answer to the Init query sent by the environment on behalf of this player. The preflow phase will determine the whole public language pub.
When initialized with security parameter k, the simulator first generates the CRS for the commitment (public parameters but also extraction and equivocation trapdoors), as well as the possibly required trapdoors to be able to generate, for any pub, a word inside or outside the language L(pub, priv) when priv is known. It then initializes the real-world adversary A, giving it these values. The simulator then starts its interaction with the environment Z, the functionality sF lake and its subroutine A.
Since we are in the static-corruption model, the adversary can only corrupt players before the execution of the protocol. We assume players to be honest or not at the beginning, and they cannot be corrupted afterwards. However, this does not prevent the adversary from modifying flows coming from the players. Indeed, since we are in a weak authenticated setting, when a player acts dishonestly (even without being aware of it), it is either corrupted, hence the adversary knows its private values and acts on its behalf; or the adversary tries to impersonate it with chosen/guessed inputs. In both cases, we say the player is A-controlled. Following [CHK + 05], we say that a flow is oracle-generated if it was sent by an honest player and arrives without any alteration to the player it was meant to. We say it is non-oracle-generated otherwise, that is if it was sent by a A-controlled player (which means corrupted, or which flows have been modified by the adversary). The one-time signatures are aimed at avoiding changes of players during a session: if pre-flow is oracle-generated for P i , then flow-one and flow-three cannot be non-oracle-generated without causing the protocol to fail because of the signature, for which the adversary does not know the signing key. Similarly, for P j . On the other hand, if pre-flow is nonoracle-generated for P i , then flow-one and flow-three cannot be oracle-generated without causing the protocol to fail, since the honest player would sign wrong flows (the flows the player sent before the adversary alters them). In both cases, the verifications of the signatures will fail at Steps (I3) or (R4) and P i or P j will abort. One can note that if there is one flow only in the protocol for one player, its signature is not required, which is the case for P j when there is no pub to agree on at the beginning. But this is just an optimization that can be occasionally applied, as for the PAKE protocol. We do not consider it here.
To deal with both cases of A-controlled players (either corrupted or impersonated by the adversary), we use the Split Functionality model (see Section 2). We thus add a pre-flow which will help us know which players are honest and which ones are A-controlled. If one player is honest and the other one corrupted, the adversary will send the pre-flow on behalf of the latter, and the simulator will have to send the pre-flow on behalf of the former. But in the case where both players are honest at the beginning of the protocol, both pre-flow will have to be sent by S on behalf of these players and the adversary can then decide to modify one of these flows. This models the fact that the adversary can decide to split a session between P i and P j by answering itself to P i , and thus trying to impersonate P j with respect to P i , and doing the same with P j . Then, the Split Functionality model ensures that two independent sessions are created (with sub-session identifiers). We can thus study these sessions independently, which means that we can assume, right after the pre-flow, that either a player is honest if its pre-flow is oracle-generated, or A-controlled if the pre-flow is non-oracle-generated. Since we want to show that the best possible attack for the adversary (by controlling a player) consists in playing honestly with a trial credential, we have to show that the view of the environment is unchanged if we simulate this dishonest player as an honest player with respect to ideal functionality. The simulator then has to transform its flows into queries to the Ideal Functionality sF lake , and namely the NewSession-query. Still, the A-controlled player is not honest, and can have a bad behavior when sending the real-life flows, but then either it has no strong impact, and it is similar to an honest behavior, or it will make the protocol fail: we cannot avoid the adversary to make denial of service attack, and the adversary will learn nothing.
As explained in [BCL + 05] and [ACGP11] , where the simulator actually had access to a TestPwd query to the functionality, it is equivalent to grant the adversary the right to test a password (here a credential) for P i while trying to play on behalf of P j (i.e., use a TestPwd query) or to use the split functionality model and generate the NewSession queries corresponding to the A-controlled players and see how the protocol terminates, since it corresponds to a trial of one credential by the adversary (one-line dictionary attack).
The proof will thus consist in generating ideal queries (and namely the NewSession) when receiving nonoracle-generated flows from A-controlled players, and generating real messages for the honest players (whose NewSession queries will be received from the environment). This will be done in a indistinguishable way for the environment.
We assume from now on that we know in which case we are (i.e.how many players are A-controlled), and the pub part is fixed. We then describe the simulator for each of these cases, while it has generated the pre-flow for the honest players by generating (VK, SK) ← KeyGen(), and thus knows the signing keys. We denote by L i = L(pub, priv i ) the language used by P i , and by L j = L(pub, priv j ) the language that P i expects P j to use. We use the same notations in the reverse direction. As explained in Section 1, recall that the languages considered depend on two possibly different relations: L i = L R i (pub, priv i ) and L j = L R j (pub, priv j ), but we omit them for the sake of clarity. Note that the simulator will use the NewKey query to learn whether the protocol is a success or a failure (in case a player is A-controlled). This will enable it to check whether the LAKE should fulfill, that is, whether the two users play with compatible words and languages, i.e.. priv i = priv i , priv j = priv j , W i ∈ L i and W j ∈ L j . For the most part, the interaction is implemented by the simulator S just following the protocol on behalf of all the honest players.
D.3 Description of the Simulators
Initialization and Simulation of pre-flow. This is the beginning of the simulation of the protocol, where S has to send the message pre-flow on behalf of each non-corrupted player 2 .
Step (I0). When receiving the first (Init : ssid, P i , P j , pub i ) from sF lake as answer to the Init query sent by the environment on behalf of P i , S starts simulating the new session of the protocol for party P i , peer P j , session identifier ssid. S chooses a key pair (SK i , VK i ) for a one-time signature scheme and generates a pre-flow message with the values (VK i , pub i ). It gives this message to A on behalf of (P i , ssid).
Step (R0). When receiving the second (Init : ssid, P j , P i , pub j ) from sF lake as answer to the Init query sent by the environment on behalf of P j , S starts simulating the new session of the protocol for party P j , peer P i , session identifier ssid. S chooses a key pair (SK j , VK j ) for a one-time signature scheme and generates a pre-flow message with the values (VK j , pub j ). It gives this message to A on behalf of (P j , ssid).
Splitting the Players. As just said, thanks to the Split Functionality model, according to which flows were transmitted or altered by A, we know from the pre-flow which player(s) is (are) honest and which player(s) is (are) A-controlled, and the public part pub. We can consider each case independently after the initial split, during which S generated the signing keys of the honest players. Thanks to the signature in the last flows for each player, if the adversary tries to take control on behalf of a honest user for some part of the execution (without learning the internal states, since we exclude adaptive corruptions), the verification will fail. Then we can assume that the sent flows are the received flows.
One can note that the prior agreement on pub allows to simulate P i before having received any information from P j , and also without knowing whether the protocol should be a success or not. Without such an agreement, the simulator would not know which value to use for pub whereas it cannot change its mind later, since it is sent in clear. Everything else is committed: either in an equivocable way on behalf of P i so that we can change it later when we know the real status of the session; or in a non-equivocable way on behalf of P j since we can check the status of the session before making this commitment. Of course, both commitments are extractable. In the whole proof, in case the extraction fails, the simulator acts as if the simulation should fail. Indeed, the language of the smooth projective hash function not only verifies the equations, but also that the ciphertext is valid, and this verification will fail.
We come back again to the case of our equivocable commitment with SPHF that is not a really extractable/binding commitment since the player can open it in a different way one would extract it, in case the second ciphertext does not encrypt 1 G : if extraction leads to an inconsistent tuple, there is little chance that with the random ε it becomes consistent; if extraction leads to a consistent tuple, there is little chance that with the random ε it remains consistent, and then the real-life protocol will fail, whereas the ideal-one was successful at the NewKey-time. But then, because of the positive NewKey-answer, the SendKey-query takes the key-input into consideration, that is random on the initiator side because of the SPHF on an invalid word, and thus indistinguishable from the environment point of view from a failed session: this is a denial of service, the adversary should already be aware of.
Hence, the three simulations presented below exploit the properties of our commitments and SPHF to make the view of the environment indistinguishable from a real-life attack, just using the simulator S that is allowed to interact with the ideal functionality on behalf of players, but in an honest way only, since the functionality is perfect and does not know bad behavior.
During all these simulations, S knows the equivocability trapdoor of the commitment and the decryption keys of the two encryption schemes.
Case 1: P i is A-controlled and P j is honest. In this case, S has to simulate the concrete messages in the real-life from the honest player P j , for which it has simulated the pre-flow and thus knows the signing key, and has to simulate the queries to the functionality as if the A-controlled player P i was honest.
Step (I1). This step is taken care of by the adversary, who sends its flow-one, from which S extracts (priv i , priv j ) only. No need to extract W i , but one generates a random valid V i ∈ L(pub, priv i ) (we have assumed the existence (NewSession : ssid, P j , P i , pub, receiver) and generates a commitment C j on a dummy tuple (priv j , priv i , V j ). It then generates a challenge value ε and the hashing keys (hk i , hp i ) on C i . It sends the flow-two message (C j , ε, hp i , σ j ) to A on behalf of P j , where σ j is the signature on all the previous information.
Step (I3). When the session (P i ; ssid ) receives the message m = (flow-two, C j , ε, hp i , σ j ) from its peer session (P j ; ssid ), the signature is necessarily correct. Then, S makes a SendKey to P i with a random key that will anyway not be used, since no player is corrupted. S sends the flow-three message (C i , t, hp j , σ i ) to A on behalf of P i , where σ i is the signature on all the previous information.
Step (R4). When the session (P j ; ssid ) receives the message m = (flow-three, C i , t, hp j , σ i ) from its peer session (P i ; ssid ), the signature is necessarily correct. S makes a SendKey to P j with a random key that will anyway not be used, since no player is corrupted.
D.4 Description of the Games
We now provide the complete proof by a sequence of games, where we replace the triple (priv i , priv j , V i ) by the notation T i , and the triple (priv j , priv i , V j ) by the notation T j , with component-wise operations to simplify notations. Similarly, for cleaner notations, we use non-vector notations for the ciphertexts, the random coins and the challenge ε, but all the computations are assumed to be performed component-wise, and thus implicitly use vectors.
We insist that we are considering static corruptions only, and with the split-functionality, we already know which players are corrupted and verification keys for the one-time signatures are known to the two players, and fixed: either honestly generated (honest player) or adversary-generated (corrupted players).
Game G 0 : This is the real game, where every flow from honest players are generated correctly by the simulator which knows the inputs sent by the environment to the players. There is no use of the ideal functionality for the moment.
Game G 1 : In this game, the simulator knows the decryption key for C i when generating the CRS. But this game is almost the same as the previous one except the way sk j is generated when P i is corrupted and P j honest. In all the other cases, the simulator does as in G 0 by playing honestly (still knowing its private values). When P i is corrupted and P j honest, S does as before until (R4), but then, it extracts the values committed to by the adversary in Com i (using the decryption key for C i ) and checks whether the private parts of the languages are consistent with the values sent to P j by the environment. If the languages are not consistent (or decryption rejects), P j is given a random session key sk j .
This game is statistically indistinguishable from the former one thanks to the smoothness of the SPHF on Com i . Game G 2 : In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption key for C i when generating the CRS. This game is almost the same as the previous one except that S extracts the values committed to by the adversary in C i to check consistency of the languages, and does not wait until Com i . If the languages are not consistent (or decryption rejects), P j is given a random session key sk j .
The game is indistinguishable from the previous one except if Com i contains consistent values whereas C i does not, but because of the unpredictability of ε, and the Pedersen commitment that is computationally binding under the discrete logarithm problem, the probability is bounded by 1/q.
The distance between the two games is thus bounded by the probability to break the binding property of the Pedersen commitment.
Game G 3 : In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption key for C i when generating the CRS, as in G 2 . Actually, in the above game, when P i is corrupted and P j honest, if extracted languages from C i are not consistent, P j does not have to compute hash values. The random coins are not needed anymore. In this game, in this particular case, S generates C j with dummy values T j .
This game is computationally indistinguishable from the former one thanks to the IND − CPA property of the encryption scheme involved in C j . To prove this indistinguishability, one makes q hybrid games, where q is the number of such sessions where P i is corrupted and P j is honest but extracted languages from C i are not consistent with inputs to P j . More precisely, in the k-th hybrid game G k (for 1 ≤ k ≤ q), in all such sessions before the k-th one, C j is generated by encrypting T j , in all sessions after the k-th one, C j is generated by 
E Complexity
In the Table 1 , we give the number of elements to be sent (group elements or scalars) and the number of exponentiations to compute for each operation (commitment and SPHF), where we consider the Equality Test, and the Linear Pairing Product Equations. One has to commit all the private inputs, and then the cost for relations is just the additional overhead due to the projection keys and hashing computations once the elements are already committed: an LCSCom commitment is 5 group elements, and a DLCSCom is twice more, plus the Pedersen commitment (one group element), the challenge ε (a scalar) and the opening t (a scalar). Note that a simple Linear commitment is just 3 group elements.
If the global language is a conjunction of several languages, one should simply add all the costs, and consider the product of all the sub-hashes as the final hash value from the SPHF.
PAKE. Two users want to prove to each other they possess the same password. In this case W i = priv j = priv i = priv j = priv i = W j . So P i will commit to his password, and thus a unique DLCSCom commitment for W i , priv i and priv i . P j can use a simple Linear commitment. They then send projection keys for equality tests: 13 group elements and 2 scalars for Com i and 5 group elements for Com j , plus VK i and σ i . This leads to 18 group elements and two scalars our PAKE scheme. The DDH-based variant would use 11 group elements and 2 scalars only in total, which is far more efficient than existing solutions, and namely [ACP09] that uses a bit-per-bit commitment to provide equivocability.
Verifier-based PAKE. As explained earlier, we do a PAKE with the common password (g pw , h pw ), where h has been chosen by the server: the commitment Com i needs 21 group elements plus 2 scalars, and 4 additional group elements to check it; the commitment Com j needs 6 group elements, and 4 additional elements to check it. Because of the ephemeral h, one has to send in total 35 group elements and 2 scalars, plus the one-time signatures. The DDH-based variant would use 25 group elements and 2 scalars only in total.
Secret Handshake. The users want to check their partner possesses a valid signature on their public identity or pseudonym (in pub) under some valid but private verification key (affiliation-hiding). More precisely, P i wants to prove he possesses a valid signature σ on the public message m (his identity or a pseudonym) under a private verification key vk: we thus have m in the pub part, priv i = vk and W = σ. This is the same for P j . Using Waters signature, σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ), where σ 1 only has to be encrypted, because σ 2 does not contain any information, it can thus be sent in clear. In addition, as noticed from the security proof, σ 2 does not need to be encrypted in an IND − PD − CCA manner, but with a simple IND − CPA encryption scheme in the third round. To achieve unlinkability, one can rerandomize this signature σ to make the σ 2 values different and independent each time.
As a consequence, the committed values are: vk that can be any group element, since with the master secret key s such that h = g s for the global parameters of the Waters signature (see the Appendix A.3) one can derive the signing key associated to any verification key, and thus generate a valid word in the language; and σ 1 in IND − CPA only. One additionally sends σ 2 in clear, and so 14 group elements plus 2 scalars for Com i , and 7 group elements for Com j . The languages to be verified are priv i = priv i , on the committed priv i = vk i with the expected priv i = vk i , and the Linear Pairing Product Equation for the committed signature σ i , but under the expected vk i : 5 group elements for the projection keys in both directions: 31 group elements plus 2 scalars are sent in total.
